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Abstract
The recent discovery of a Higgs boson prompted increased attention
of statisticians and philosophers of science to the statistical
methodology of High Energy Physics (HEP). Amidst long-standing
debates within the field, HEP has adopted a mixed statistical
methodology drawing upon both frequentist and Bayesian methods, but
with standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and
confidence interval estimation playing a primary role. Physicists within
HEP typically deny that their methodological decisions are guided by
philosophical convictions, but are instead based on “pragmatic”
considerations, thus distancing themselves from what they perhaps
perceive as an ongoing pitched ideological battle between frequentists
and Bayesians. Here I argue that there is a philosophical orientation to
HEP that is neither exclusively frequentist nor Bayesian, but that lies
squarely in the tradition of philosophical pragmatism. I further argue
that understanding the statistical methodology of HEP through the
perspective of pragmatism clarifies the role of and rationale for
significance testing in the search for new phenomena such as the Higgs
boson.
2
1 Introduction
On July 4, 2012 the CMS and ATLAS collaborations held a joint press conference
at CERN to announce their latest findings from the search for the Higgs boson.
ATLAS spokesperson Fabiola Gianotti declared that they had observed “clear signs
of a new particle, at the level of 5 sigma, in the mass region around 126 GeV”
(ATLAS 2012). The CMS statement reported the observation of an “excess of
events at a mass of approximately 125 GeV with a statistical significance of five
standard deviations above background expectations . . . . We interpret this to be
due to the production of a previously unobserved particle with a mass of around
125 GeV” (CMS 2012). CMS and ATLAS considered the evidence insufficient to
declare that the new particle was the Higgs boson itself, but only stated that the
evidence was consistent with the expectations from decays of a Higgs boson.
Press coverage emphasized the appeal in these declarations to a standard of
discovery: In order to announce the discovery of a new particle, the physicists
needed to show that they had found an excess of candidate events beyond the
expectations from background alone that would constitute a departure of at least
five standard deviations (“5σ”). The associated probability statement was reported
variously. In the New York Times, it was stated that “Both groups said that the
likelihood that their signal was a result of a chance fluctuation was less than one
chance in 3.5 million, ‘five sigma,’ which is the gold standard in physics for a
discovery” (Overbye 2012). Reuters noted that “Five sigma, a measure of
3
probability reflecting a less than one in a million chance of a fluke in the data, is a
widely accepted standard for scientists to agree the particle exists” (Wickham &
Evans 2012).
Meanwhile, on a discussion forum on the website of the International Society
for Bayesian Analysis, statisticians noted not only the appeal to the 5σ standard,
but more generally the reliance of both groups on the significance testing
methodology that yielded the relevant calculation: a p-value that was then
converted into a distance from the background expectation, expressed in terms of a
number of standard deviations. Tony O’Hagan, prompted by “[a] question from
Dennis Lindley” posted a series of queries about the Higgs search results, including
the following two:
1. Why such an extreme evidence requirement? We know from a Bayesian
perspective that this only makes sense if (a) the existence of the Higgs boson
(or some other particle sharing some of its properties) has extremely small
prior probability and/or (b) the consequences of erroneously announcing its
discovery are dire in the extreme. Neither seems to be the case, so why
5-sigma?
2. Rather than ad hoc justification of a p-value, it is of course better to do a
proper Bayesian analysis. Are the particle physics community completely
wedded to frequentist analysis? If so, has anyone tried to explain what bad
science that is? (O’Hagan 2012a)1
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These questions put into play two distinct issues regarding the statistical
methodology of HEP. One is the use of the methodology of significance testing.
The other is the apparent reliance on the 5σ standard for discovery claims. In this
paper, I will focus on the question of the warrant for HEP’s reliance on significance
testing, though this will lead naturally to consideration of the 5σ standard. The
second of O’Hagan’s questions explicitly assumes that “it is better to do a proper
Bayesian analysis.” Were this the case, then the use of significance testing in HEP
would indeed be puzzling, and one would want to investigate the reasons for the
persistent failure of presumably well-trained and mathematically competent
scientists to take advantage of the availability of a better method of analysis than
that which they use. I will argue that O’Hagan’s presupposition is in fact incorrect:
the use of significance testing in such contexts as the Higgs search is
well-warranted, and a Bayesian analysis is not “of course better.”
My intention in this paper is not, however, to trudge along the well-worn
paths of the debates between frequentists and Bayesians (though my course might
intersect these at some points). Rather, I will ask what warrants the application of
significance testing to the specific tasks for which HEP employs such tests?
Answering that question requires attention both to the roles played by significance
testing in the context of the experimental arguments of HEP and to the
epistemological aims of experimental HEP. It also requires, I will argue, a
framework for understanding how those aims inform the determination of a
statistical methodology. For purposes of this paper, that framework is supplied by
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pragmatism, a philosophical orientation first articulated in detail by C. S. Peirce.
By considering the example of the search for the Higgs boson and the role of
significance testing in the arguments emerging from that search, I will thus show
how philosophical pragmatism can illuminate the statistical practices of HEP,
revealing the warrant for those practices. The resulting perspective also holds
promise, I will argue, for a better understanding of the second issue raised above:
the warrant for the use of a 5σ standard for discovery in HEP.
I begin my argument in §2 with a quick summary of the methodology of
significance testing, particularly as it is applied in the search for new phenomena in
HEP. Then, in §3, I summarize some of the prominent criticisms of significance
testing. To better understand the specific and limited role of significance testing, I
turn in §4 to an overview of the argument offered by ATLAS in their July 2012
paper declaring “Observation of a New Particle.” I sketch the basic tenets of
pragmatism, roughly as espoused by Peirce, and extended by Churchman, in §5.
Stage-setting thus completed, I will show in §6 how, by adopting the perspective of
pragmatism, we can understand the warrant for HEP’s use of significance testing,
thus addressing the previously discussed criticisms of that practice. In §7 I offer
some brief comments on the 5σ standard in light of the argument previously given,
and then summarize the paper’s conclusions in §8.
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2 Significance testing in HEP
By characterizing their evidence in terms of an estimate of the statistical
significance of their findings, ATLAS and CMS adopted the language and
methodology of significance testing. Here I briefly summarize in a rough and
informal way the main points of this widely used methodology.2
A significance test is a device for answering a question. To attempt an
answer, one formulates a substantive hypothesis that is a possibly correct and
testable answer to that question. This is the null hypothesis H0. The investigator
must devise a means of generating data for such a test, and then define some
quantity, called a test statistic, that is a function of the data and has a known
probability distribution supposing that hypothesis is true. The test statistic should
be defined such that larger values indicate stronger evidence of departure from
what is expected if the null hypothesis is true. The probability distribution of the
test statistic under the null hypothesis is the null distribution. The null
distribution thus serves as a mathematical model of the null hypothesis, and the
direct target of the test is the statistical hypothesis that the data are generated by
a process characterized by the null distribution. Knowing both the null distribution
and the observed value of the test statistic, one may then ask: how probable is it
that one would get a value as great or greater than that observed value, assuming
the statistical null hypothesis is true? To the extent that the null distribution is a
good model of the substantive null hypothesis, the answer to that question will
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serve as a good estimate of the corresponding probability with regard to the null
hypothesis itself.
In the context of a search for a new phenomenon in HEP, the purpose of the
significance test is to quantify the extent to which indications of the sought-after
phenomenon exceed what one would expect to see in the data in the absence of
that phenomenon. The substantive null hypothesis is thus the hypothesis that only
background processes contribute to the data. Typically one will conceptualize this
in terms of a theoretical parameter µ, defined over a parameter space (set of
possible values of µ) M, such that if the substantive null “background only”
hypothesis is true, then µ = µ0;µ0 ∈ M, with the value of µ0 conventionally set at
zero. The alternative hypothesis H1 can then be understood as asserting that
µ = µ1;µ1 ∈ M, for some µ1 6= µ0, so that the distinction between H0 and H1
amounts to a partition of M. Devising a test of the null hypothesis begins with the
determination of a physical signature of the phenomenon sought after, based on its
hypothetical features. In the case of a search for a particle, for example, such a
signature might come in the form of the decay of the hypothetical particle into
other, already established particles that are identifiable via their measurable
properties. Experimenters must then operationalize that physical signature in
terms of data selection criteria (cuts) that define candidates for the phenomenon in
question. For a given set of cuts, they must then estimate the rate at which
background processes will yield events satisfying those cuts. This amounts to the
determination of the null distribution. However, HEP experiments commonly do
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not use simply the number of candidate events as their test statistic, but instead
the quantity d(X) = −2ln λ(µ0|X)
sup{λ(µ1|X)} . This statistic uses the likelihood function
λ(µ|X), a function that assumes different values for various values of µ ∈ M for
fixed data X, such that λ(µ|X) ≡ Pr(X;µ). The quantity d(X) thus takes greater
values to the extent that the supremum (least upper bound) of the likelihoods of
the alternative values of µ exceed the likelihood of the null value µ0.
Once the data X are in hand, the observed value of the test statistic d0(X)
can be recorded and the probability Pr(d(X) ≥ d0(X);µ0) can be calculated. This
is the p-value of the experimental result. It has become standard practice in HEP
to convert this probability number into a number of σ’s by referring to the
Standard Normal distribution (even when it does not describe the actual
distribution of d(X)) and determining what number of standard deviations from
the mean of that distribution would correspond to the p-value in question.
That, at any rate, is the basic outline of how significance testing is used in
searches for new phenomena in HEP. Particular applications often involve
additional complications, as we will see in the case of the Higgs search.
3 Problems with p-values?
O’Hagan’s comment about HEP’s reliance on frequentist statistical analysis (such
as significance testing) being “bad science” calls to mind first of all the
longstanding disputes between frequentist and Bayesian views about probability
and statistical analysis. Significance testing in particular has come in for a great
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deal of criticism, to the extent that calls for the reform or elimination of
significance testing constitute a genre within the statistical literature.
In a classic of the genre Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) note
important respects in which inferences based on significance testing conflict with
Bayesian inferences. They emphasize in particular the circumstances in which a
small p-value will lead to rejection of (or conclusion of strong evidence against) a
null hypothesis while a Bayesian inference would assign substantial probability to
the null. This situation arises as a consequence of a general result, known as the
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox (Jeffreys 1961; Lindley 1957). We need not here dwell on
the derivation of this result, but can avail ourselves of the basic result. In Lindley’s
original paper, this is stated as follows:
[I]f H is a simple hypothesis and x the result of an experiment, the following
two phenomena can occur simultaneously:
i. a significance test for H reveals that x is significant at, say, the 5% level;
ii. the posterior probability of H, given x, is, for quite small prior
probabilities of H, as high as 95%. (Lindley 1957, 187)
The intuitive explanation of this apparent conflict is that it comes about when the
width of the sampling distribution is narrow in comparison to the range of possible
parameter values. This can result, for example, from the accumulation of a large
amount of data. Results that, compared to the overall parameter space, lie rather
close to what one expects from the null distribution, may nonetheless register as
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improbable under the null. Moreover, such an apparent mismatch between p-value
and posterior probability can be made arbitrarily great for sufficiently large sample
size n.
The condemnation of p-values that has followed from this result and related
issues constitutes a veritable chorus calling either for the elimination of p-values or
their modification through various ancillary devices (Berger & Sellke 1987;
Diamond & Forrester 1983; Schervish 1996; Sellke, Bayarri, & Berger 2001;
Sprenger 2013; Ziliak & McCloskey 2008).
Considering the problem a little more carefully, it becomes a little unclear
exactly what basis the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox provides for objecting to the use of
significance testing (see Robert 2014; Spanos 2013; Sprenger 2013 for some recent
philosophical discussion). There is no direct contradiction, of course, between
saying that the probability of getting d(X) ≥ d(xo), assuming H0 is true, is less
than 0.05 and saying that the probability of H0 being true is 0.95. The
probabilities in the two statements have entirely different meanings and entirely
different foundations of assessment. Everyone acknowledges this point, but critics
of significance testing go on to argue that the ‘paradox’ remains a problem for
significance testing because it shows that taking p-values as a measure of the
evidence against the null hypothesis is a bad idea. (This argument might be
pressed under the assumption that some specific Bayesian measure of evidence
(posterior probabilities, Bayes factors) is a good measure of evidence.)
Here again, though, the objection seems to miss the mark, since the
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appropriate use of significance testing does not support the use of p-values as a
measure of evidence against the null hypothesis. To object to the use of
significance testing because it is sometimes misused is analogous to objecting to the
use of electric guitars in general because you don’t like 1980’s “hair metal” bands.
This point, too, is officially acknowledged by at least some critics, but they press
the objection anyway by appealing to the ubiquity of the misuse. Hair metal bands
are everywhere, and the only remedy is to ban electric guitars altogether. Berger
and Sellke provide a good example of the dialectic. Having objected to the use of
p-values as a measure of evidence against the null, they write:
At this point, there might be cries of outrage to the effect that p = .05 was
never meant to provide an absolute measure of evidence against H0 and any
such interpretation is erroneous. The trouble with this view is that, like it or
not, people do hypothesis testing to obtain evidence as to whether or not the
hypotheses are true, and it is hard to fault the vast majority of nonspecialists
for assuming that, if p = .05, then H0 is very likely wrong. (Berger & Sellke
1987, 114)
Here Berger and Sellke play off an ambiguity in the expression “people do
hypothesis testing to obtain evidence.” Their argument depends on understanding
the use of hypothesis testing “to obtain evidence” as the performance of hypothesis
testing and subsequent interpretation of the results of such tests as a measure of
evidence. But another interpretation, and one that is compatible with the
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appropriate use of significance testing, is that people regard the results of
significance tests as relevant evidence regarding the correctness of the hypothesis
under test, without the resulting p-values constituting a measure of the evidence
against the tested hypothesis. Such would be the case, for example, if one thought
that p-values should be considered in judging the correctness of the tested
hypothesis, but that the specific bearing that any particular p-value has requires
further interpretation in light of other pieces of information (which could include
confidence intervals, effect size, severity analysis, likelihood functions, etc.) (Senn
2001).
I will not attempt here to assess whether it is true that the misuse or
misinterpretation of p-values is widespread among scientists. I will not even
directly address that question for the case of HEP in general. Instead I propose to
look at the particular case of the Higgs boson discovery and examine how p-values
are used in that case and whether the physicists of CMS and ATLAS are guilty of
this allegedly widespread practice. To the extent that statistical methodology used
in the arguments for the discovery of the Higgs is representative of statistical
practice in HEP more generally, we can then at least formulate a hypothesis about
whether significance testing in HEP is guilty of the charges raised by critics.
4 Context: the Higgs search at ATLAS
The announcements of the “observation” of the Higgs boson by CMS and ATLAS
appeared in press releases made at the time of the July 4, 2012 press conference,
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but the papers making the more detailed argument were released in preprint
shortly thereafter (Aad et al. 2012b; Chatrchyan et al. 2012b). As an informed
reading of those papers makes evident, it would be a grave misunderstanding to
suppose that the arguments supporting their discovery claims depend on little
more than the establishment of a p-value meeting the 5σ standard.
A detailed explanation of the arguments that CMS and ATLAS offer in
support of their discovery claims would in fact far surpass what may reasonably be
purveyed in the present context. Here I will restrict myself to a sketch, with just
enough detail to establish the limited, though important, role of the significance
calculation in the overall argument. I will also restrict myself to a discussion of the
paper published by ATLAS. The CMS paper differs in some details, but the overall
structure of their argument is the same in its essential features, and the general
point could just as readily be made by reference to it.
The data on which ATLAS bases its discovery claim come from two distinct
periods of data-collection. The 2011 dataset was collected with the LHC operating
at a center-of-mass energy of
√
s = 7 TeV, while the 2012 dataset came from a
√
s = 8 TeV run. The introduction to ATLAS’s paper notes that both ATLAS and
CMS had already found excesses (Aad et al. 2012a; Chatrchyan et al. 2012a)
beyond background expectations in the 2011 data “compatible with SM Higgs
boson production and decay in the mass region 124–126 GeV, with significances of
2.9 and 3.1 standard deviations, respectively” (Aad et al. 2012b, 1). To further
contextualize their present finding, they note the “broad excess in the mass region
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120–135 GeV” reported by the CDF and D0 experiments at Fermilab’s Tevatron
collider.
Crucial to the argumentative strategy of the ATLAS paper is the
identification of distinctive decay modes of the Higgs boson that lead to distinct
search strategies. A Standard Model (SM) Higgs boson has seven distinct decay
modes: γγ, WW , ZZ, ττ , bb, Zγ, and µµ. All but the last two are mentioned in
the ATLAS paper, but it is searches for the first three that provide the data on
which the discovery claim rests. These different decay modes add evidential weight
to the statistical significance argument insofar as they help to fix the theoretical
interpretation of the excess indicated: the excesses show up in multiple channels in
a manner that is predictable in light of knowledge about the rates at which the
Higgs should decay in those channels and the size of the backgrounds in each of
them. They also enable further probing of the import of the data insofar as most of
the excess contributing to the statistical significance was found in just two of the
five decay channels with relatively high signal-to-background ratios expected for a
125 GeV Higgs. The theoretical interpretation of the finding in terms of a
Standard Model Higgs boson will require that excesses be found as well for the
remaining channels, and the lack of data in these channels was one of the reasons
why the ATLAS paper claims only the observation of “a new particle” rather than
the Higgs boson specifically.
The guidance of theory is important to the validation of ATLAS’s evidence
claim in another way. ATLAS relies on statistical models of both the background
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and the signal for a SM Higgs boson. Neither of these statistical models can be
calculated directly from theory. Both require the use of simulation. For the signal,
this simulation does depend, however, on a theoretical characterization of the
processes by which Higgs bosons are produced (see, e.g., Harlander & Kilgore
2002). Understanding the signal is important both for developing and optimizing
the analytic procedures to be applied to data and for the comparison of the
observed excess with that expected for a SM Higgs with a mass near that reported.
For present purposes, the latter consideration is particularly salient.
The theoretical description of the Higgs is crucial for ATLAS in guiding the
simulation of the signal that is the target of their search. This is another respect in
which an exclusive focus on the significance calculation obscures the overall
character of their argument: in addition to demonstrating that they have achieved
a statistical significance in excess of 5σ, ATLAS presents a comparison between the
excess that they observe and what one would expect from SM Higgs decays near a
mass of 125 GeV (see figure 1(b)). Moreover, they do this not only for the
combined results, but also separately for the results from each of the three decay
channels that figure in their discovery. In each case, it is important that the results
fit, at least at a qualitative level, with the expectations from a SM Higgs boson
with mH ∼ 125 GeV, and not so well with the expectations for a Higgs with mass
far from that value. Such an agreement amongst different search modes would not
be likely for data generated by background processes alone.
Another important aspect of the ATLAS argument is their characterization of
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Fig. 7. Combined search results: (a) The observed (solid) 95% CL limits on the signal
strength as a function of mH and the expectation (dashed) under the background-
only hypothesis. The dark and light shaded bands show the ±1σ and ±2σ uncer-
tainties on the background-only expectation. (b) The observed (solid) local p0 as a
function of mH and the expectation (dashed) for a SM Higgs boson signal hypothe-
sis (µ= 1) at the given mass. (c) The best-fit signal strength µˆ as a function of mH .
The band indicates the approximate 68% CL interval around the fitted value.
582 GeV. The observed 95% CL exclusion regions are 111–122 GeV
and 131–559 GeV. Three mass regions are excluded at 99% CL,
113–114, 117–121 and 132–527 GeV, while the expected exclu-
sion range at 99% CL is 113–532 GeV.
9.2. Observation of an excess of events
An excess of events is observed near mH =126 GeV in the H→
Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and H → γ γ channels, both of which provide fully
reconstructed candidates with high resolution in invariant mass, as
shown in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b). These excesses are confirmed by the
highly sensitive but low-resolution H→ WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channel,
as shown in Fig. 8(c).
The observed local p0 values from the combination of channels,
using the asymptotic approximation, are shown as a function of
mH in Fig. 7(b) for the full mass range and in Fig. 9 for the low
mass range.
The largest local significance for the combination of the 7 and
8 TeV data is found for a SM Higgs boson mass hypothesis of
mH = 126.5 GeV, where it reaches 6.0σ , with an expected value
in the presence of a SM Higgs boson signal at that mass of 4.9σ
(see also Table 7). For the 2012 data alone, the maximum local sig-
nificance for the H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, H→ γ γ and H→ WW (∗) →
Fig. 8. The observed local p0 as a function of the hypothesised Higgs boson mass
for the (a) H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, (b) H → γ γ and (c) H → WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channels.
The dashed curves show the expected local p0 under the hypothesis of a SM Higgs
boson signal at that mass. Results are shown separately for the
√
s = 7 TeV data
(dark, blue in the web version), the
√
s= 8 TeV data (light, red in the web version),
and their combination (black).
Fig. 9. The observed (solid) local p0 as a function of mH in the low mass range.
The dashed curve shows the expected local p0 under the hypothesis of a SM Higgs
boson signal at that mass with its ±1σ band. The horizontal dashed lines indicate
the p-values corresponding to significances of 1 to 6 σ .
eνµν channels combined is 4.9σ , and occurs at mH = 126.5 GeV
(3.8σ expected).
The significance of the excess is mildly sensitive to uncertain-
ties in the energy resolutions and energy scale systematic uncer-
tainties for photons and electrons; the effect of the muon energy
scale systematic uncertainties is negligible. The presence of these
Figure 1: Three mp rtant ways of valuating the ATLAS result . In (a) the solid line
indicates 95% confi en e limits on the value of µ establish d by the observed data,
while the dotted lin indicat s the CL’s that would be expected for background only,
with bands showing the ±1σ and ±2σ uncertainties on the background expectation.
In (b) the solid line gives the local p-value as a function of mH , while the dotted line
indicates the expected p-value based on simulation of the signal, also as a function
of mH . The best-fit estimate µˆ of the signal strength as a function of mH is given in
(c). 17
the excess that they find. In particular, they estimate the mass of the new particle
that they have observed using the profile likelihood ratio λ(µ,mH).
3 On a plot of µ
versus mH , a confidence interval will, in the presence of a strong signal, yield a
contour. ATLAS presents a plot that shows the 68% and 95% confidence intervals
in the (µ,mH) plane for each of the H → γγ, H → ZZ, and H → WW channels.
The first two form distinct but overlapping contours, while the latter yields no
lower bound on mH (figure 2). Regarding the separation between the contours
based on the H → ZZ, and H → WW channels, ATLAS notes that the
“probability for a single Higgs boson-like particle to produce resonant mass peaks
[in those two channels] separated by more than the observed mass difference,
allowing the signal strengths to vary independently, is about 8%” (Aad et al. 2012b)
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Table 7
Characterisation of the excess in the H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, H→ γ γ and H→ WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channels and the combination of all channels listed in Table 6. The mass value
mmax for which the local significance is maximum, the maximum observed local significance Zl and the expected local significance E(Zl) in the presence of a SM Higgs
boson signal at mmax are given. The best fit value of the signal strength parameter µˆ at mH = 126 GeV is shown with the total uncertainty. The expected and observed mass
ranges excluded at 95% CL (99% CL, indicated by a *) are also given, for the combined
√
s= 7 TeV and √s= 8 TeV data.
Search channel Dataset mmax [GeV] Zl [σ ] E(Zl) [σ ] µˆ(mH = 126 GeV) Expected exclusion [GeV] Observed exclusion [GeV]
H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ 7 TeV 125.0 2.5 1.6 1.4± 1.1
8 TeV 125.5 2.6 2.1 1.1± 0.8
7 & 8 TeV 125.0 3.6 2.7 1.2± 0.6 124–164, 176–500 131–162, 170–460
H→ γ γ 7 TeV 126.0 3.4 1.6 2.2± 0.7
8 TeV 127.0 3.2 1.9 1.5± 0.6
7 & 8 TeV 126.5 4.5 2.5 1.8± 0.5 110–140 112–123, 132–143
H→WW (∗) → ℓνℓν 7 TeV 135.0 1.1 3.4 0.5± 0.6
8 TeV 120.0 3.3 1.0 1.9± 0.7
7 & 8 TeV 125.0 2.8 2.3 1.3± 0.5 124–233 137–261
Combined 7 TeV 126.5 3.6 3.2 1.2± 0.4
8 TeV 126.5 4.9 3.8 1.5± 0.4
7 & 8 TeV 126.5 6.0 4.9 1.4± 0.3 110–582 111–122, 131–559
113–532 (*) 113–114, 117–121, 132–527 (*)
uncertainties, evaluated as described in Ref. [138], reduces the lo-
cal significance to 5.9σ .
The global significance of a local 5.9σ excess anywhere in the
mass range 110–600 GeV is estimated to be approximately 5.1σ ,
increasing to 5.3σ in the range 110–150 GeV, which is approxi-
mately the mass range not excluded at the 99% CL by the LHC com-
bined SM Higgs boson search [139] and the indirect constraints
from the global fit to precision electroweak measurements [12].
9.3. Characterising the excess
The mass of the observed new particle is estimated using the
profile likelihood ratio λ(mH ) for H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and H → γ γ ,
the two channels with the highest mass resolution. The signal
strength is allowed to vary independently in the two channels,
although the result is essentially unchanged when restricted to
the SM hypothesis µ = 1. The leading sources of systematic un-
certainty come from the electron and photon energy scales and
resolutions. The resulting estimate for the mass of the observed
particle is 126.0± 0.4 (stat)± 0.4 (sys) GeV.
The best-fit signal strength µˆ is shown in Fig. 7(c) as a function
of mH . The observed excess corresponds to µˆ= 1.4±0.3 for mH =
126 GeV, which is consistent with the SM Higgs boson hypothesis
µ= 1. A summary of the individual and combined best-fit values
of the strength parameter for a SM Higgs boson mass hypothesis
of 126 GeV is shown in Fig. 10, while more information about the
three main channels is provided in Table 7.
In order to test which values of the strength and mass of a
signal hypothesis are simultaneously consistent with the data, the
profile likelihood ratio λ(µ,mH ) is used. In the presence of a
strong signal, it will produce closed contours around the best-fit
point (µˆ,mˆH ), while in the absence of a signal the contours will
be upper limits on µ for all values of mH .
Asymptotically, the test statistic −2 lnλ(µ,mH ) is distributed as
a χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. The resulting 68%
and 95% CL contours for the H → γ γ and H → WW (∗) → ℓνℓν
channels are shown in Fig. 11, where the asymptotic approxima-
tions have been validated with ensembles of pseudo-experiments.
Similar contours for the H→ Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ channel are also shown
in Fig. 11, although they are only approximate confidence intervals
due to the smaller number of candidates in this channel. These
contours in the (µ,mH ) plane take into account uncertainties in
the energy scale and resolution.
The probability for a single Higgs boson-like particle to pro-
duce resonant mass peaks in the H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and H → γ γ
Fig. 10. Measurements of the signal strength parameter µ for mH = 126 GeV for the
individual channels and their combination.
Fig. 11. Confidence intervals in the (µ,mH ) plane for the H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ, H →
γ γ , and H → WW (∗) → ℓνℓν channels, including all systematic uncertainties.
The markers indicate the maximum likelihood estimates (µˆ,mˆH ) in the corre-
sponding channels (the maximum likelihood estimates for H → Z Z (∗) → 4ℓ and
H→WW (∗) → ℓνℓν coincide).
channels separated by more than the observed mass difference, al-
lowing the signal strengths to vary independently, is about 8%.
The contributions from the different production modes in the
H → γ γ channel have been studied in order to assess any ten-
sion between the data and the ratios of the production cross
Figure 2: Confidence intervals in the (µ,mH) plane for the H → γγ, H → ZZ, and
H → WW channels. Maximum likelihood estimates (µˆ, mˆH) re marked with ‘+’.
In particle physics experiments past, the problem of potential bias from
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knowing too much about the data before finalizing the cuts has created difficulties.
By “tuning the cuts,” one might be able to enhance or create the appearance of a
statistically significant signal. This problem had generated controversy in the early
analyses of data from the search for the top quark at Fermilab (Staley 2002, 2004),
and both ATLAS and CMS, well stocked with veterans of the CDF and D0 top
searches, were eager to avoid a repetition of such problems. Consequently, ATLAS
makes a point of establishing early in the paper that the new 8 TeV data, except
for subsets used as control samples, were kept blinded while the analyses used for
identifying candidate events in different categories were re-optimized on control
and simulated data (Aad et al. 2012b, 1). This point supports the validity of that
aspect of the argument that relies on the significance calculation: a biased
procedure for selecting the cuts will invalidate the probability model on which the
significance calculation depends. More precisely, the probability of a given excess of
candidate events when only background processes are present is greater if the
definition of ‘candidate event’ was chosen in a way that is tailored towards
increasing the number of candidate events among the data in hand, compared to
the number that would be found for cuts defined independently of the data in hand
(Staley 2002). By keeping the data blinded while the analyses were developed,
ATLAS protected themselves from being misled regarding the statistical
characterization of the excess in their data.
At the same time, ATLAS implicitly acknowledges that the p-value itself is
less than perfectly well-defined. The reason for this is related to the fact that the
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distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis itself is not uniquely
defined. The sensitivity of the experiment to the presence of decays of Higgs
bosons depends in part on an unknown parameter: the mass of the Higgs boson
mH . Assuming that Higgs bosons do exist, the rate at which they are produced is a
decreasing function of mH . This bears on the definition of the test statistic, in
which the likelihood function for the alternative hypothesis H1 appears in the
denominator. Put differently, mH is a nuisance parameter in the Higgs search, a
parameter on which the sampling distribution for d(X) depends, but that has an
unknown value. Both CMS and ATLAS faced this difficulty, and dealt with it
using somewhat different implementations of the same strategy, which is to begin
by regarding the p-value as a function of the parameter mH , report that function
(see Figure 1b),4 and then find the minimum value of that function pmin. The
latter quantity is then reported as the local p-value. However, the value of mH ,
being unknown at the outset, is not in fact set in advance, and the local p-value is
thus a fiction of sorts. The probability (call it “preal” for now) that the experiment
would report an excess as great as that observed for some value or other of the
Higgs mass, assuming the null hypothesis is true, is greater than the local p-value.
This is known as the “Look Elsewhere Effect” (LEE).
How much greater is preal than pmin? That depends on the range of values of
mH that one considers, and just what that range should be is not uniquely defined.
For this reason my suggested label preal must be discarded as strictly aspirational
at best, along with any illusions we might have held to this point about the p-value
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for the Higgs search results having a uniquely well-defined value. Instead, both
ATLAS and CMS reported, along with their local p-values, global p-values. Global
p-values are defined relative to specified ranges of values for mH , and both groups,
in order to emphasize that these ranges are “arbitrary or subjective” (Cousins
2013, 33), reported both “wide” and “narrow” ranges, based on different criteria.
Cousins notes, “Some possibilities were the range of masses for which the SM Higgs
boson [had] not previously been ruled out at high confidence; the range of masses
for which the experiment is capable of observing the SM Higgs boson; or the range
of masses for which sufficient data had been acquired to search for any new boson.
The experiments made different choices” (ibid.). They certainly did. The narrow
range reported by ATLAS runs from 110 to 150 GeV (with a significance of 5.3σ),
while the wide range reported by CMS is 110–145 GeV (with a significance of
4.5σ). Reporting these global significance values thus serves as a kind of check on
the sensitivity of the statistical significance to the LEE.
To an outsider, the attitudes of particle physicists towards p-values evidenced
here may seem conflicted, or even inconsistent. On the one hand, the concern over
bias arising from tuning the cuts might suggest an objectivist attitude towards
p-values, according to which the significance calculation is aimed at estimating the
value of a quantity that has a well-defined objective value, a successful estimate of
which will be close to that objective value. On the other hand, the discussion of
the LEE acknowledges a crucial ambiguity regarding the p-value, reflecting what
we might call a fictionalist attitude, which denies that the p-value has a uniquely
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correct value, but persists in regarding it as a useful quantity to discuss. The
objectivist attitude would not by itself commit particle physicists to regarding the
p-value as a measure of the evidence that a body of data provides against the null
hypothesis, but the fictionalist attitude is clearly incompatible with treating the
p-value in this way.
I propose that ATLAS’s concern about bias arising from tuning the cuts can
be given a natural interpretation that is coherent with a fictionalist attitude toward
their p-values while also making sense of their treatment of the LEE. According to
this alternative interpretation, although there is no well-defined, uniquely correct
p-value, some ways of estimating the statistical significance of the results of the
Higgs search have a greater tendency than others to provide misleading guidance
regarding the severity5 with which potential errors have been ruled out,
particularly the error of mistaking a stochastic variation in the size of the excess
for an effect of a genuinely new physical phenomenon.
On this view, the relevance of the p-value of the Higgs search results for
ATLAS’s claim to have discovered a new particle is that it quantifies one dimension
of a multi-dimensional evaluation of the evidence supporting that claim. It is
important, for the purpose of cogently arguing for their claim, that ATLAS be able
to establish that they have taken sufficient care to rule out, on a reasonable basis,
the possibility of being misled by a stochastic fluctuation in the background. The
calculation of a p-value addresses that need. As David Cox has noted, “significance
tests . . . address the question of whether the data are reasonably consistent with a
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null hypothesis in the respect tested. This is in many contexts an interesting but
limited question” (Cox 2006, 42). Other dimensions of ATLAS’s assessment of the
evidence that are essential to their experimental argument include the distribution
of the candidate events across different decay modes, the comparison of the data
with theoretical expectations for a Higgs boson with a mass in the range indicated
by the data, the ability to arrive at an estimated mass for the candidate decay
events, the comparison of the estimated mass for different decay channels, and the
satisfaction of methodological constraints on the treatment of data.
5 Pragmatism
My contention in this paper is that attending to the role that significance
calculations play in ATLAS’s experimental argument will help us to understand
the warrant for their reliance on significance testing, and that such understanding
is facilitated by the philosophical perspective provided by pragmatism. In this
section, I briefly characterize the pragmatic philosophical perspective, with
particular attention to its application in the context of choosing statistical
methods. A thorough discussion of pragmatism itself would naturally exceed the
scope of the present paper, and I will seek only to sketch enough of the aims and
approach of pragmatism to illuminate how it contributes to understanding the
warrant for the use of significance testing in the Higgs search.
When philosophical issues are mentioned at all in particle physicists’
discussions of statistical methodology, they are typically disavowed. For example,
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in discussing the statistical methodology developed by the Higgs working group for
establishing exclusion limits at a 2000 CERN workshop, A. L. Read notes that
It has not been an explicit goal of the Higgs working group to choose a
frequentist(-like) analysis rather than a Bayesian analysis on philosophical
grounds. Our attitude is rather practical, we want to do the best we can with
the data that we have, where the best we can means excluding the Higgs as
strongly as possible in its absence . . . and confirming its existence as strongly
as possible in its presence. . . while holding the probabilities of falsely
excluding a true signal or falsely discovering a non-existent signal at or below
specified levels. (Read 2000, 82)
Disavowals notwithstanding, I claim that Read’s practical attitude expresses
an implicit, underlying, pragmatic philosophical outlook. Pragmatism constitutes a
philosophical orientation that grows out the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey, among others. Although ‘pragmatism’ is a
capacious term covering a broad range of philosophical points of view, the writings
of these “classical” pragmatists are of special importance in establishing the central
features of pragmatic philosophies, and Peirce in particular has important insights
into scientific reasoning.
I do not, of course, contend that physicists in HEP have any particular
grounding in the writings of these authors. (I suspect most HEP physicists have
never read them or given them a thought.) Neither do I suppose that there is a
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uniform statistical philosophy shared by all members of the HEP community.
Indeed, some particle physicists have advocated strongly for the abandonment of
the frequentist methods that are routinely employed in HEP, in favor of Bayesian
methods (D’Agostini 2003; D’Agostini 2011; Bhat, Prosper, & Snyder 1997;
Prosper 2006). Rather, I maintain that HEP physicists have, in response to the
inferential problems that face them, collectively developed an approach on their
own that looks very much like applied pragmatism – i.e., they are doing just what
one would, on the basis of philosophical pragmatism, recommend that they do.
That pragmatism begins with a disavowal of commitments to a fixed statistical
ontology, but it does not end there.
In an 1878 paper titled “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce sought to
articulate a methodology for achieving a higher grade of clarity than previously
articulated. Whereas Descartes’s standard for “clear and distinct” ideas suffered
from its reliance on the efficacy of a power of introspection, on which he had
previously cast doubt in his 1868 essay “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties
Claimed for Man” (Peirce 1992[1868]), Peirce now proposed “a method of reaching
a clearness of thought of a far higher grade” (Peirce 1992[1878], 127). That method
Peirce articulates in the form of a “rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of
apprehension”:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these
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effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (ibid., 132)
Let us call this rule the pragmatic maxim. The term “practical” here must be
understood in its broad philosophical sense, in which it refers to intentional actions
of any sort. Effects that might conceivably have practical bearings are thus those
that we can consider, for some possible circumstances, to be relevant to some
choice of action. Importantly, that action might be one undertaken in the course of
pursuing some inquiry. Such is precisely the context in which scientists must
choose a statistical inference procedure, and a pragmatic orientation towards
statistics would require the application of the pragmatic maxim to the potential
inferences to be drawn in a given inquiry.
The practical orientation of the pragmatic maxim requires such inferences to
be regarded as a species of action, undertaken for a certain aim, with a range of
potential consequences. This point was emphasized clearly in the work of C. West
Churchman, who developed an account of “pragmatic inference” that incorporated
the theories of statistical inference of Neyman and Pearson and Wald (which were
in turn anticipated by Peirce’s own “theory of probable inference” (Peirce 1883))
into a broader pragmatic framework drawing on the work of Peirce and Dewey
(Churchman 1948). For an inference regarded pragmatically, three kinds of
question must be addressed to adequately apply the pragmatic maxim: (1) What is
your aim? (2) How might you go wrong? and (3) What is at stake? Tailoring these
questions a little more closely to the problematic of a scientific investigator seeking
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a statistical methodology, these become: (1) What are the learning goals of the
experiment? (2) What are the possible errors that must be confronted? and (3)
What are the foreseeable practical consequences of those errors or their absence,
including those that bear on further and related inquiries?
6 Warrant for significance testing
It is these three questions that hold the key to the pragmatic warranting of
ATLAS’s statistical practices, so it is worth taking them in turn.
Beginning with the aims of the Higgs search at ATLAS, it goes without saying
that among their aims was to answer the question “Does the Higgs boson exist?”
But leaving it at that underspecifies their aim egregiously. A clearer statement can
be found in the previously quoted words of A. L. Read: “we want to do the best we
can with the data that we have, where the best we can means excluding the Higgs
as strongly as possible in its absence . . . and confirming its existence as strongly as
possible in its presence. . . while holding the probabilities of falsely excluding a true
signal or falsely discovering a non-existent signal at or below specified levels.” It is
the last-mentioned aspect of this aim that renders the reliance on significance
testing appropriate: the aim of limiting the probability of declaring a discovery in
the presence of a mere fluctuation in the background calls for precisely the kind of
probabilistic assessment that issues from a calculation of a p-value.
Turning to the second question, we can see that the articulation of the aims
of the Higgs search already incorporate an important part of the answer to the
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question of the possible errors. Thinking of the possible errors simply as accepting
the existence of the Higgs when only background processes are present and failing
to accept the Higgs hypothesis when the Higgs is present provides us with only the
coarsest-grained description of the landscape of errors surveyed by the ATLAS
physicists. The complexity of that landscape reflects the complexity of the analytic
procedures ATLAS brought to bear on their data. For the purpose of simply
assessing the warrant for ATLAS’s reliance on significance testing it will have to
suffice that the two primary ways of going wrong – accepting the background only
hypothesis when it is false, rejecting it when it is true – are the ultimate source of
concern, and all of the more fine-grained possibilities of error become relevant
precisely because of their potential to lead to one or the other of these two main
errors.
ATLAS’s choice of a methodology of significance testing is warranted in light
of their aims and in light of the kinds of errors they sought to avoid. There is no
evidence that they sought to provide a quantitative measure of the evidence
against the background hypothesis or in favor of the Higgs (or even Higgs-like)
hypothesis. They sought instead to be able to make a clear and compelling case
either for or against the existence of the Higgs, while limiting the probability of
doing so erroneously. Significance testing alone is not sufficient for this aim, but it
can contribute to the pursuit of it, by providing evidence regarding the
compatibility of the data with the background-only hypothesis. The
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox entails that such evidence must be interpreted in light of
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further information, but not that significance calculations are not relevant evidence
regarding the acceptability of the null.
The third of the pragmatic questions receives no explicit treatment in
ATLAS’s published Higgs results. This, however, does not mean that consideration
of it played no identifiable role in their deliberations over the statistical assessment
of their data. On the contrary, the consequences of erroneously announcing a
discovery of the Higgs played an important role in their reliance on what many
regarded as an extremely strict standard of significance: the “5σ” rule previously
mentioned. As this may constitute the clearest instance of pragmatic thinking in
this episode, this point deserves its own discussion.
7 The 5σ standard
Although the requirement that discovery claims in HEP be premised on statistical
excesses with p-values that equate to at least five standard deviations for a
Gaussian distribution has assumed the status of tradition within the HEP
community,6 it has no official institutional codification and physicists will deny
that its normative force is absolute. According to Joe Incandela, who was
spokesperson for CMS at the time of the July 2012 announcements, “the 5 sigma
standard is generally misunderstood outside the field. We do not take 5 sigma as
absolutely necessary nor do we assume all 5 sigma results to be correct” (personal
communication). Similarly, CMS member Robert Cousins comments, “I do not
believe that experienced physicists have such an automatic response to a p-value,
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but it may be that some people in the field may take the fixed threshold more
seriously than is warranted” (Cousins 2013, 30). Meanwhile, some physicists have
called for reform of the 5σ standard. Louis Lyons, for example, has called for a
“more nuanced criterion” that would be more or less demanding for a variety of
possible future discoveries, based on four criteria: the presence of an LEE, the
magnitude of systematic uncertainties, the impact of the discovery, and the “degree
of surprise” (also called the “subconscious Bayes’ factor”) (Lyons 2013).
Lyons’ criteria cohere well with responses that Tony O’Hagan received from
physicists to his query regarding the rationale for the 5σ criterion, mentioned in §1.
Acknowledging the statistical (and pragmatic) inappropriateness of an ironclad
significance threshold for discovery claims, these responses (apart from a minority
of Bayesians calling for the abandonment of significance testing altogether)
indicated an acceptance of 5σ as an appropriate standard for the Higgs search
itself. (In Lyons’ enumeration of varying significance standards from 3 to >8
standard deviations for fourteen different HEP searches, the standard for the Higgs
search remains at 5σ.) Prominent among the considerations cited are the LEE and
systematic uncertainty, or more generically, to quote O’Hagan’s summary, the fact
that “so much can go wrong that it makes sense to guard against false positives
caused by errors in underlying assumptions, pre-processing, experimental controls,
etc.” (O’Hagan 2012b, 5).
The problems of the LEE and systematic uncertainties constitute obstacles
toward taking the calculated local significance seriously as a measure of what it
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purports to be: the probability of observing an excess as great as or greater than
that observed, assuming that only background processes are present. They leave
unaddressed the further questions of why the standard for discovery should be a
very demanding one in the first place (why is 3σ not good enough?) and why it
should not be even more demanding (why would 8σ not be even better?). These
questions can be addressed only through the criterion of the impact of the
discovery, which is to say, the consideration of the third pragmatic question: What
are the foreseeable practical consequences of the possible errors or their absence?
Although answers to this question do not determine univocally a precise standard
that must be applied (as with any convention, some element of arbitrariness in the
choice will always remain), they will illuminate the reasons that shaped the terrain
in which the decision was made.
The pragmatic perspective requires us to acknowledge that the outcome of an
inference is not only an event in an abstract realm of ideas, but is a decision with
practical consequences. As noted by C. West Churchman,
In pragmatic methodology, every scientific hypothesis is considered to be a
possible course of action for accomplishing a certain end, or set of ends.
Pragmatically speaking, an inability to say what one intends to do as a result
of accepting one out of a set of alternative hypotheses, is an inability to state
the hypotheses themselves in adequate terms. (Churchman 1948, 259)
We can place the consequences of the decisions of the ATLAS and CMS groups to
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announce discoveries into two categories: those that pertain directly to the logical
argumentation of future physics inquiries, and those that pertain indirectly to the
aims of ATLAS, CMS, and the HEP community more broadly.
Regarding the first category, accepting the existence of a new boson amounts
to a commitment to adopt statements entailing the existence of such a particle as
premises in the pursuit of further inquiries. This commitment has its most obvious
salience for the continued work of ATLAS and CMS themselves, as their analytic
tasks turn from the aim of producing exclusion plots towards the aim of measuring
the properties of the newly discovered particle and probing further implications of
the Higgs hypothesis to fix more securely the theoretical interpretation of their
finding. For other physicists working on SM and Beyond-SM problems, the
announcement by ATLAS and CMS has the consequence of changing the logical
terrain. Although each investigator must decide (whether as an individual or as a
member of a working group) whether the evidence offered by the two CERN groups
suffices to warrant agreement with their discovery claims, it seems likely that the
burden now lies on those who would decline those claims to explain their dissent.
These considerations contribute to our understanding of the 5σ standard for the
Higgs search by highlighting the importance, for the pursuit of physics inquiries
within ATLAS and CMS as well as beyond, of guarding against an erroneous
discovery claim, while also pointing towards the tremendous value of that discovery
claim, as it enables the pursuit of new inquiries that, prior to discovery, had to wait
offstage.
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The second category of consequences must be regarded as somewhat more
speculative, but various statements of physicists involved in the Higgs search at
least suggest some relevant considerations. CMS’s published paper declares in its
introduction that “The discovery or exclusion of the SM Higgs is one of the
primary scientific goals of the Large Hadron Collider” (Chatrchyan et al. 2012b,
30). Given the great expense of building the LHC and operating the CMS and
ATLAS experimental programs, it is not surprising that success at achieving this
goal was highly valued. The much-anticipated discovery claims themselves were not
merely attended by submitting papers for publication, but by a kind of scientific
showmanship featuring a press conference that was broadcast via the internet
worldwide and featured prominently among the news of the day. To get things
wrong would have been tremendously embarrassing. Although one cannot be
certain of the consequences of such an error, it is not unreasonable to imagine them
including even a political dimension with negative consequences for the funding of
HEP.
One respondent to O’Hagan’s query communicates vividly the personal
nature of such considerations: “In fact, we do have high standards because in our
view we are trying to arrive at ‘true’ statements about the world in the pragmatic
sense that these statements yield predictions that turn out to be correct. Given
that the search for the Higgs took some 45 years, tens of thousands of scientists
and engineers, billions of dollars, not to mention numerous divorces, huge amounts
of sleep deprivation, tens of thousands of bad airline meals, etc., etc., we want to
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be sure as is humanly possible that this is real” (O’Hagan 2012b, 5).
In addition to concerns about the amount of effort and expense that had gone
into the search for the Higgs and its importance to the scientific project of the
LHC, a broader sense of responsibility toward the public perception of science in
general may have played a role in the cautious attitude toward any discovery
announcement. According to CMS member Robert Cousins, the intense public
spotlight that the LHC had felt since 2008 made it clear that there was an
opportunity to try to show science of very high quality to the general public, in an
environment where there was public skepticism about some scientific claims.
Certainly making a discovery announcement that subsequently turned out to be
erroneous carried a very high cost, and could only contribute to such skepticism
(personal communication).
Taking the pragmatic perspective allows us to see that such considerations
regarding the consequences of an inference are not extraneous to the scientific
process, but rather help to clarify it. A clear articulation of the meaning of an
inference will bring to light its practical dimension, thus helping us to understand
the evidential standards that have been brought to bear on it – standards that
might otherwise seem entirely arbitrary or mysterious.
8 Conclusion
This paper has argued that pragmatism helps us to understand how the statistical
methodology of HEP is warranted. The argument focused on the particular case of
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the use of p-values in the argument for the discovery of a new Higgs-like boson
based on the Higgs search results at ATLAS and CMS. In spite of the oft-repeated
objections to p-values, the LHC physicists’ use of them was warranted because they
employed significance testing for the specific purpose of providing evidence relevant
to the multi-dimensional assessment of the hypothesis that their excess of Higgs
candidates was due to a stochastic fluctuation of non-Higgs background processes,
and not for the purpose of providing a quantitative measure of the evidence against
the background-only hypothesis. Their use of significance testing was tailored to
specific inferential aims, in light of explicit consideration of the possible errors that
could be made in drawing that inference, and with at least implicit attention to the
consequences of such errors, both for immediate matters of related scientific
inquiries and for broader matters related to the place of HEP and science in society.
In spite of this defense, I do not wish to be understood as stating that all is
well regarding the statistical methodology in HEP and we can be satisfied with the
status quo. There are three dimensions along which improvements would be
desirable, and to some extent are already being pursued by physicists themselves.
The first of these consists of the use of better statistical methods within HEP.
Statisticians persist in the pursuit of ever more powerful methodologies, tailored to
the demands of specific kinds of inferential problems. Particle physicists themselves
have in the past contributed to the development of new statistical methods
(Feldman & Cousins 1998; Prosper 1988). and there is no reason to think that
further improvements cannot or should not be pursued. Acknowledging the
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limitations on significance calculations as they are employed in HEP is itself a
reason, not only to supplement p-values with other arguments as described here,
but also to seek better tools. This task is ongoing and appropriately undertaken by
physicists and statisticians in consultation, as well as by statistically sophisticated
physicists.
A second route to doing better would be for more members of the HEP
community to achieve the level of understanding of the results of applying
statistical methods that has already been achieved by many physicists who are
well-educated in statistics and reflective on the philosophical nuances of statistical
methodology. Some members of the HEP community have already noted the
connection between statistical education and clear communication of the meaning
of scientific results (D’Agostini 2011). To improve in this respect, it is not necessary
that physicists become philosophers of statistics, but only that the statistical
education of physicists include an ongoing emphasis on the kind of conceptual and
interpretive issues that are all too easily dismissed as “just philosophy.”
The final route to doing better vis a vis statistics in HEP is that pointed out
by attention to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and the three questions that derive from
its application to problems of statistical inference, particularly the third question:
“What is at stake?” I have argued here that considerations of the consequences of
possible errors of inference played an important (though not exclusive) role in the
determination of standards of evidence for purposes of announcing a discovery
based on the Higgs search results at LHC. Discussions of the practical
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consequences of accepting a hypothesis are part of the pragmatic clarification of an
inference. Yet current norms governing scientific communication tend to force such
discussions into informal, background contexts, so that the resulting decisions
appear to the public as they were reported in the press following the Higgs
announcement of July 2012: as a “gold standard” or as a “strict notion of scientific
certainty” the status of which is simply to be taken for granted. Although I would
not propose that every positive scientific claim must be accompanied by a detailed
discussion of the deliberations that guided the choice of evidential standard that
was applied to that claim, I do think that a more complete execution of the
program of pragmatic clarification should include a more systematic expectation
that scientists in fields such as HEP should address explicitly and thoroughly the
considerations – including those regarding potential consequence of errors – that
guide such decisions.
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Notes
1O’Hagan collected and summarized the many replies he received to his
post. In this digest, he noted that he had intentionally used somewhat
inflammatory language to “provoke discussion” (O’Hagan 2012b).
2A more systematic treatment is given in numerous statistical texts; see,
e.g., Cox & Hinkley 1974.
3When confronted with a statistical model with multiple parameters, all
but one of which are considered ‘nuisance’ parameters, the profile like-
lihood for the parameter of interest is obtained by maximizing over the
likelihoods of those parameters (Cox 1970; Venzon & Moolgavkar 1988).
4As Cousins states, “for each mass [mH ] there is a p-value for the departure
from H0, as if that mass had been fixed in advance” (Cousins 2013, 33,
emphasis in original).
5I have in mind here the notion of severity discussed by Mayo (e.g., 1996;
2006, 2009), though perhaps nothing in my argument depends essentially
on this.
6Allan Franklin has documented the emergence of the 5σ standard in HEP
(Franklin 2013). According to Franklin’s narrative, the standard has only
44
assumed the weight that it does carry rather recently, around the time
of the discovery of the top quark, for which an initial paper by CDF
in 1994 (Abe et al. 1994) claimed only “evidence” (with a significance
corresponding to 2.8σ for a Gaussian distribution), while later papers by
CDF (Abe et al. 1995) and D0 (Abachi et al. 1995) claimed the top’s
“observation” on the basis of 5.0σ and 4.6σ, respectively (Staley 2004).
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